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Did I request thee, Maker, from my clay to mould me man? Did I solicit thee from 
darkness to promote me? — (Milton, Paradise Lost)1 
 
While there is more than one way to become a child’s parent, procreating a child 
is typically sufficient to achieve that status. But whether a person has procreated a child 
and thereby become her parent requires that her acts have some causal role in bringing 
that child into existence. To procreate is to create, not simply to bring into being, so as we 
shall understand this term, ‘procreating’ is an action type, not merely a causal relation. 
The precise causal role that a parent plays in procreation may vary: Most often, a parent 
is genetically related to a child, but he or she may participate in procreation by fulfilling a 
different biological role (e.g., gestating a genetically unrelated fetus). Beyond a causal 
contribution to the child’s existence, procreation requires that the child’s existence be a 
fact that can be attributed to her and her choices. A person procreates a child, on this 
view, either by (a) acting so as to contribute to bringing into existence a child for whom 
one intends to serve as a parent, or (b) by engaging knowingly and willfully in acts that 
contribute to bringing a child into existence (for example, ‘accidentally’ conceiving a 
child via sexual acts), irrespective of whether one intends to serve as that child’s parent. 
On this understanding, an incompetent minor, ignorant of the mechanics of biological 
reproduction, cannot procreate.  Nor does a gestational surrogate who has relinquished 
 
1 As will become evident later on, I find the fact Mary Shelley chose this as the epigraph to Frankenstein to 
illustrate an important insight regarding the source of parental obligations.  
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any claims to serve as the child’s parent.2 As a way of becoming a child’s parent, 
procreation thus contrasts with paths through which an individual becomes a child’s 
parent with no causal role in bringing the child into existence, e.g. the adoption of a child 
who already exists.  
 My aim in this article is to evaluate some common ethical convictions about 
procreation and its relationship to both parental rights and parental obligations. In 
particular, I will consider the following claims, which together we may call the 
procreative model: 
1. Competent adults have a right to procreate. This right is negative, entailing that 
others may not interfere with procreative acts or choices (except in extreme 
cases), and perhaps positive, entailing that individuals may be entitled to medical 
or other assistance to enable procreation. 
2. Parents acquire a set of rights with respect to their children due to their being 
responsible for the existence of their children. These rights include the right to 
control a child’s physical location, to guide the child’s personal relationships, to 
exercise proxy judgment on the child’s behalf, and (more controversially) to 
shape a child’s education and to raise the child in the parent’s particular religious 
or cultural traditions. 
 
2 Medical personnel may appear to be a difficult case, since they seem to satisfy (b) but do not procreate the 
children to whose existence they causally contribute. While I cannot fully defend this claim here, their 
contribution is the result of parents enlisting their assistance in procreating; they are therefore ‘sub-actors’ 
with respect to procreation and so do not satisfy (b). 
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3. These parental rights are exclusive, in that only a child’s parents have these rights 
with respect to that child (or have them to anywhere near the same extent as 
others may). 
4. These parental rights are accompanied by a set of parental obligations, including 
providing for a child’s material welfare, stimulating the child’s emotional and 
cognitive development, not abandoning, abusing, or neglecting a child, and 
protecting the child from abuse, attack, and other dangers.  
5. These parental obligations interact with parental rights in that flagrant or repeated 
violations of these obligations can result in parents losing one or more of their 
rights vis-à-vis their children, including in the most extreme cases forfeiture of 
parental custody and cessation of the parent-child relationship. 
 
 Obviously, the procreative model does not provide a complete account of the 
ethics of parent-child relations. It is silent, for instance, on the obligations children bear 
toward their parents. Nevertheless, the procreative model incorporates what I take to be a 
widely shared understanding regarding the ethical relations between parents and children 
with respect to the most common way in which these relations are established, namely, 
via procreative acts. And it is my contention that extant attempts to account for how 
procreation generates parental rights have serious shortcomings. Here I hope to 
demonstrate why this is so and develop a stronger defense of the procreative model.  
Our concern, then, is with how procreative acts might serve as the source of 
parental rights and obligations. Suppose that the answer to the question ‘how can parents 
have the rights and obligations they have toward their children?’ is along the lines of 
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‘often enough, by virtue of having procreated those children.’ My purpose is to identify 
the best defense of this answer. In this respect, there are two important dimensions of the 
procreative model about which I will say little. First, aside from parental rights and 
obligations regarding education, I will leave much of the content of parental rights and 
obligations aside. Again, the aim here is to consider whether the procreative model can 
account for parents having rights and obligations vis-à-vis their children, not with 
precisely which rights and obligations parents have. Second, I contribute little to the issue 
of the procreative model’s limits. In procreating, parents create beings with claims on 
other individuals and on their societies. Furthermore, those beings consume 
environmental and societal resources. Hence, any defense of the procreative model as a 
source of parental rights and obligations is incomplete absent an engagement with issues 
pertaining to how many times or how often parents may exercise their procreative rights. 
I do not tackle such issues here. 
One possible justification of the procreative model as the source of parental rights 
and obligations is that parents are assigned these rights and obligations because doing so 
is in the vital interests (perhaps even the ‘best interests’) of the child. This child interest 
justification contrasts with the parent interest justification, according to which parents are 
assigned these rights and obligations because doing so serves some vital interests of 
parents. I first attempt (in sections 1 and 2) to show that neither of these interest-based 
justifications adequately justify the procreative model. The child interest justification 
cannot be squared with the exclusivity and presumptiveness that the procreative model 
assigns to parental rights. Nor can it be squared with the extensive procreative liberty 
associated with that model. For its part, the parent interest justification cannot bridge the 
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gap between prospective parents’ interests in becoming parents and their having a right to 
become parents. In particular, an interest that is popularly invoked as the basis of parental 
rights, the interest in having the kind of uniquely intimate or loving relationship parents 
can have with children, is not sufficient to ground a right to bring a being into existence 
in order to satisfy this interest. Appeal to these interests to ground the procreative model 
is even less plausible if procreation is morally objectionable from the standpoint of the 
procreated. I argue in section 3 that in procreating, individuals create a new human 
person who faces her future from a set of initial conditions determined by her genetic 
profile, her early life material circumstances, her parental and familial relationships, 
cultural expectations, and so on. How that new human person can exercise her will over 
her lifetime to craft a life of her choosing is profoundly influenced by these initial 
conditions, conditions into which she is involuntarily placed by her procreative parents. 
We have, I contend, good moral reasons to object to our wills being encumbered by these 
initial conditions. Procreation always places a person into specific life circumstances that 
she does not choose but which substantially demarcate the horizon of possible lives she 
may have. Procreative encumberings are thus wrong, I argue, in something like the way 
in which compelling an individual into a romantic or marital relationship wrongfully 
encumbers her will: To subject an individual, without her authorization, to a state of 
affairs that substantively determines the arc of her life possibilities objectionably 
constrains her will. 
This argument nevertheless contains a silver lining, as it paves the way to an 
alternative justification of the procreative model: If procreation is a wrongful 
encumbering, then procreators have an obligation to compensate their offspring for this 
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wrong. This general obligation is in turn the source of other more specific parental 
obligations, as well as of parental rights. A chief advantage of this compensatory account 
of parental rights and obligations is that it identifies a feature of procreation that is 
universal but specific. Because of this constitutive wrong, every procreative parent has a 
duty to compensate her offspring for this wrong. The compensatory account thus 
succeeds in making sense of how particular acts of procreation can generate parental 
rights and obligations specific to the offspring one procreates. More generally, my 
compensatory account better vindicates the procreative model, giving individuals wide 
latitude to procreate, making parental rights exclusive and reasonably presumptive, and 
linking these rights to procreation without having to bridge the chasm between 
prospective parents’ interest in becoming parents and their putative right to become 
parents. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of parental rights vis-à-vis children’s 
education, and in particular, how the provision of education might serve to provide 
children restitution for the wrongs of procreation. 
 
1. Child interest justifications of parental rights 
 Much of the popular rhetoric and legal practice surrounding parenthood and 
procreation assumes that children’s interests are well served, perhaps even best served, 
when those responsible for their biological existence are assigned the distinctive rights 
and obligations of parenthood. In some quarters, procreation is seen as a transformative 
experience,3 capable of turning otherwise somewhat self-absorbed individuals into 
adoring parents who love their children unconditionally and are willing to sacrifice most 
 
3 Paul, “What You Can’t Expect When You’re Expecting.” 
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anything for their children’s sake. Legal practices surrounding divorce, incarceration, and 
immigration, which often emphasize maintaining or reunifying families established via 
procreation, reflect a similar conviction that children are best off under the care of those 
who procreated them.  
 Such sentiments suggest a justification for the procreative model resting on 
children’s interests. According to this justification, parental obligations are fundamental 
and parental rights derivative, co-originating in children’s interests: The fulfillment of the 
moral obligations of parenthood ensures that children’s interests are protected and 
realized; procreative parents are best suited to fulfill the moral obligations of parenthood; 
thus, assigning procreative parents these obligations, as well as corresponding parental 
rights, is justified by appeal to children’s interests.4  
 As a generalization, the claim that procreative parents are best suited to fulfill the 
moral obligations of parenthood is probably correct. Certainly once a relationship is well 
established between children and their procreative parents, the disruption to this 
relationship that would occur if children were removed from their households and 
assigned to other parents would be a source of great trauma and anxiety to children. 
However, virility is not virtue, and there is no particular reason to suppose that having 
ultimate responsibility for a child’s existence makes one competent as a parent, much the 
less that one is best suited (i.e., better suited than any other prospective guardian) to 
parent a child in that child’s best interests. In advocating for a regime of parental 
licensing, Hugh LaFollette points to a wide range of empirical findings regarding the 
prevalence of abuse and neglect by parents. As it turns out, parents who incur obligations 
 
4 Blustein, Parents and Children: The Ethics of the Family, 104-114, and Archard,” The obligations and 
responsibilities of parenthood,” 107-108. 
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toward their children through procreation rather than adoption are in fact more likely to 
be incompetent parents.5 LaFollette’s licensing proposal is obviously controversial, and it 
is not my purpose to endorse it here. However, it does help illustrate the primary 
difficulty of justifying the procreative model by appeal to the best interests of children, 
namely, that there seems to be no special causal connection between a child’s being one’s 
procreative progeny and being disposed to act in that child’s best interests. Again, this is 
not to say there is no such connection: It would be surprising if a child’s procreative kin 
were not often the best qualified to serve as their parents (though even here we might 
question whether biological facts as such explain this, as opposed to, say, the relationship 
biological parents build with their children over time). Yet if the procreative model were 
grounded in the best interests of children, then parental rights would be less exclusive 
than the procreative model supposes inasmuch as other competent prospective parents 
would have conditional claims to parent children whose procreators are incompetent. 
Such rights would also be something less than presumptive: Less evidence would be 
necessary in order to override the parental rights claims of procreative parents.  
The procreative model obviously has a strong grip on the customs and norms of 
various societies. But it is unlikely that a community primarily concerned with children’s 
interests would bind together procreative acts and parental rights as tightly as the 
procreative model does. Indeed, were the procreative model grounded in children’s best 
interests, we would likely be much more willing to decouple procreative acts from 
parental rights altogether. This possibility is encapsulated in what Sarah Hannan and 
Richard Vernon  call the ‘Plato worry’. Just as Plato advocated that children be 
 
5 LaFollette, “Licensing Parents” and “Licensing Parents Revisited.”  
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redistributed in order to meet the state’s interest in class specialization, the procreative 
model (if grounded in the interests of children) should entail a willingness to redistribute 
children in order to advance their interests: 
If children’s interests would be better served in being raised by people other than their biological 
or adoptive parents — say by those who work within state-run institutions — then according to the 
child-centered view it would be not only permissible, but required, that they be taken from their 
current parents. …Moreover, this redistribution would not constitute a violation of the original 
parent’s rights because under the child-centered account their rights are predicated solely on the 
interests of the child…6  
In other words, if parental rights are rooted in children’s interests, then the rights of 
procreative parents with respect to the children they are responsible for creating would be 
much more contingent than the procreative model allows. 
Furthermore, the very right to procreate would likewise be more contingent than 
the procreative model presupposes if it is justified by appeal to children’s best interests. 
A number of practical concerns arise in connection with proposals to limit procreative 
liberty. Yet there may well be some individuals for whom procreation ought to be 
proscribed altogether if the right to procreate rests on the interests of children. Nature 
sometimes bestows the capacity to procreate on those without the wisdom, patience, 
energy or interest needed to parent in ways conducive to children’s interests. It is hard to 
discern how the procreative model can rightfully bestow parental rights and obligations 
on such individuals under the auspices of serving children’s interests. 
Defenders of the procreative model may well point out the practical difficulties 
that would arise if, despite our culture’s current attachment to the procreative model, we 
 
6 “Parental Rights: A Role-based Approach,” 112. See also Brighouse and Swift, “Parents’ Rights and the 
Value of the Family,” 86. 
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attempted to implement a model of parental rights and obligations that deviated from it. 
They may also try to salvage the procreative model by gravitating toward a less 
demanding criterion regarding children’s interests, claiming that (say) procreative parents 
need only be ‘good enough’ in serving their children’s interests in order to retain their 
rights as parents. Yet neither of these responses undermine the key theoretical criticism of 
grounding the procreative model in children’s interests, namely, that the ability to 
procreate (or arrange for procreation) and the ability to parent are too contingently related 
for children’s interests to provide an adequate vindication of the procreative model. 
 
2. Parent interest justifications of parent rights 
 The alternative is to ground the procreative model on the interests of parents. 
Many possible interests of parents could be invoked here, but advocates of this model 
often appeal to the distinctive goods parents can enjoy thanks to their relationships with 
their children. For instance, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift7 (2006) propose that the 
parent-child relationship is unique among human relationships in being a relationship 
between unequals, in which one party is noticeably more vulnerable and needy; such that 
children cannot exit the relationship; characterized by spontaneous and unconditional 
love on the part of children; and fiduciary in that parents are entrusted with the immediate 
and future well-being of their children. Together these features lend the parent-child 
relationship a form of intimacy that makes these relationships incommensurable with 
other adult relationships and contributes uniquely to parents’ flourishing and to the 
development of their capacities. In a similar vein, Christine Overall states that a 
 
7 “Parents’ Rights and the Value of the Family,” 95-96. 
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fundamental “asymmetry” is built into the parent-child relationship inasmuch parents 
choose to create their children and hence choose to establish a relationship with their 
children. This asymmetry makes possible “mutually enriching, mutually enhancing love” 
between the parties and hence provides what Overall believes is the best reason for 
procreation.8  
 Can the procreative model be justified by appeal to prospective parents’ interest in 
realizing the special goods associated with parent-child relationships? One concern is that 
this justification appears vulnerable to a version of the aforementioned Plato worry. At 
most, this appeal establishes that individuals have an interest, and hence a right to, be a 
parent. However, it does not establish the procreative model’s claim that individuals have 
the right to parent the children they procreate. As such, the appeal to parents’ interests in 
having a relationship with their children seems to allow, inter alia, for the redistribution 
of children away from those who procreate but have no desire for such a relationship 
toward those individuals who desire such relationships but are unable to procreate.9  
 That concern notwithstanding, I believe we should be skeptical that an appeal to 
this parental interest can generate the kinds of rights claims embedded in the procreative 
model. Most fundamentally, the fact that individuals may have an interest in having 
relationships with the distinctive sort of intimacy afforded by the parent-child 
relationship cannot entail that individuals have a right to bring a new being into existence 
in order to help realize that interest. Even if such an interest establishes a right to parent, 
it falls short of establishing a right to procreate.  
 
8 Why Have Children? The Ethical Debate, 217. 
9 Gheaus, “The Right to Parent One’s Biological Baby.” 
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To see why, we must first consider what sort of right the right to procreate is. 
According to the procreative model, procreative rights are at least negative, i.e., all other 
individuals (and the state) have a duty to refrain from interfering in competent adults’ 
procreative acts and efforts.10 Whether these rights are also positive, requiring other 
individuals (perhaps again, including the state) to enable or to assist in making possible 
procreation, is more controversial.11 Notice that whether or not a right to procreation is, 
with regard to other already extant beings, negative or positive, this right is, with respect 
to the person brought into existence, clearly more than a negative right. In asserting a 
right to procreate, a prospective parent is not asserting that not yet existing beings may 
not interfere with her procreating. The procreator instead asserts a kind of claim on a not 
yet existing being, a claim akin to a positive right in that the prospective parent seeks a 
good from the child, in this case, the good of having a fulfilling relationship with that 
child.  
Yet it hard to discern how this putative positive right might be grounded in a 
parental interest in having such a relationship. Whether an individual’s interest is 
sufficient to ascribe to her a positive right that others fulfill that interest depends on both 
how vital the interest is, as well as on the extent or weight of the burdens that would 
befall others required to honor this right. Whatever interest we may have in establishing 
and maintaining a fulfilling relationship with our potential children does not seem to be 
as vital as the interests commonly thought to undergird positive rights, such as our 
interests in basic subsistence, health care, education, and legal counsel when accused of a 
 
10 LaFollette and others who favor ex ante restrictions on procreation would of course disagree. 
11 Robertson, “Gay and lesbian access to assisted reproductive technology.” 
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crime. One cannot have a minimally satisfying life (at least in any minimally developed 
society) without these goods. But one can have a minimally satisfying life without having 
the distinctive sort of parent-child relationship afforded by procreation. However, there 
are clearly some people whose interest in this kind of relationship is deep and abiding, as 
is attested to by the great lengths some go to in trying to become parents, whether 
through atypical biological means (various forms of assisted reproduction) or through 
legal means (adoption). So let us allow that this interest may at least sometimes be vital 
enough to generate a positive right. That still leaves the question of whether the burdens 
that exercising this positive right imposes on those who are procreated are sufficient to 
outweigh the parental interests on which this right rests. Positive rights can clearly be 
limited in what they ask of others by way of assisting in the fulfillment of their associated 
interests. As Judith Thomson12 taught us, even if the only thing that will save us from 
dying is the cool caress from the hand of a Hollywood icon, we do not obviously have a 
right to that cool caress despite how vital our interest in continued living might be. There 
are some burdens we may not ask others to bear even in the service of our vital interests. 
The question at hand is whether we may ask others to bear the burdens of procreation in 
the service of our interests in having the special sort of relationship often found between 
parents and children. 
Recently, philosophers have become more skeptical that the burdens procreation 
imposes on the procreated can be justified.13 Seana Shiffrin summarizes these burdens: 
 
12 “A Defense of Abortion.” 
13 Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm,” and Benatar, Better 
Never to Have Been. 
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By being caused to exist as persons, children are forced to assume moral agency, to face various 
demanding and sometimes wrenching moral questions, and to discharge taxing moral duties. They 
must endure the fairly substantial amount of pain, suffering, difficulty, significant disappointment, 
distress, and significant loss that occur within the typical life. They must face and undergo the fear 
and harm of death. Finally, they must bear the results of imposed risks that their lives may go 
terribly wrong in a variety of ways.14  
 
That such burdens are not sufficient to generate a positive right to procreation — despite 
the vital relationship interest prospective parents may have in procreation — becomes 
plausible when we consider whether there are rights to other relationships that impose 
burdens on others. In general, our interests in having various relationships generate no 
positive claim to such relationships. Long-term romantic relationships are arguably 
sources of distinct goods as well. Adults have negative rights to pursue such relationships 
(within the limits established by other moral rights and considerations). Yet they certainly 
do not also have positive rights to such relationships. Those unable to form romantic 
attachments have no claim against the larger world to be provided such attachments, and 
no matter how much Romeo loved Juliet, he had no claim on her love. But if we lack any 
positive right to relationships with particular existent others it is difficult to see how we 
can have a positive right to bring another person into existence, even in order to serve 
our interests in having a certain form of relationship with them. For say what one will 
about romantic relationships, they do not impose burdens as weighty or extensive as 
those that Shiffrin catalogs as the burdens imposed on those we procreate. Hence, if our 
interest in having romantic relationships is as fundamental as our interest in having a 
 
14 Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm,” 136-137. 
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parent-child relationship of the sort described by Brighouse and Smith and Overall, and 
yet (a) the former interest is not sufficiently fundamental to ground a positive right, and 
(b) such relationships do not impose burdens as extensive or weighty as procreation 
imposes on our offspring, then it appears very unlikely that the latter interest can ground 
a positive right to procreation. There is, then, a reasonable basis for skepticism about the 
claim that procreators’ interests in having relationships of “mutually enriching, mutually 
enhancing love” with their children entail their having the relevant right to such 
relationships. They may have a right that third parties not interfere with procreation, but 
they do not apparently have a claim against the children they procreate that they be 
procreated. 
 
3. The will and the wrongs of procreation 
 The arguments of the previous section showed that parent interests cannot justify 
the procreative model. This conclusion is all the more likely if exercising the negative 
right to procreate is a wrong to the procreated. For there cannot be a positive right to 
bring a person into existence if that very act is a wrong to that person. 
To see what such a wrong may consist in, consider Shiffrin’s account of harm: 
…harm involves conditions that generate a significant chasm or conflict between one’s will and 
one’s experience, one’s life more broadly understood, or one’s circumstances. … all [harms] have 
in common that they render agents or a significant aspect of their lived experience like that of an 
endurer as opposed to that of an active agent, genuinely engaged with her circumstances, who 
selects, or endorses and identifies with, the main components of her life.15   
 
15 Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of Harm,” 123. 
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Let us set aside the issue of whether Shiffrin is correct in her account of harm.16 For my 
account of the wrongs of procreation will not assert that procreation wrongs by harming a 
person in any typical sense. Let us instead focus on Shiffrin’s talk of a “chasm” between 
a person’s will and her life or its circumstances. 
 The right to procreate is general, but procreative acts always result in specific 
individuals coming into existence. And those individuals have identities that stem not 
only from the genetic inheritance bequeathed them by their genetic parents, but also  
from the initial circumstances of one’s birth. These initial circumstances are not destiny. 
But they are powerful determinants of the shape and quality of one’s life. A person’s 
genetic makeup; her place in the family birth order; her parent’s personalities and 
professions; her material circumstances; the larger environment, including its political, 
environmental, and anthropological attributes; all of these constrain the possible ways in 
which a person’s life can unfold. They are significant determinants of, to use Shiffrin’s 
words, “the main components” of a person’s life. Yet no person is afforded the 
opportunity to ‘select,’ ‘ endorse’ or ‘identify with’ these components, as all of these are 
unchosen. For the most part, an individual can only ‘endure’ these initial conditions and 
their subsequent effects.  
In every act of procreation, there is therefore a ‘chasm’ between a person’s will and 
her circumstances, not in the sense that those circumstances are contrary to her will but in 
the sense that those circumstances encumber her will. Procreation is on its face wrongful 
simply because it establishes a chasm between the will of the procreated and the life they 
experience due to being brought into existence. Procreation necessarily places a person 
 
16 For critiques, see Bradley, “Doing Away with Harm,” and Rabenberg, “Harm.” 
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into specific life circumstances — she is born into this family with this genetic 
inheritance in this society, etc. —that exert wide ranging influence on what her life could 
be like. We have strong moral reasons to object to the range of possibilities among which 
we might choose a life for ourselves being limited in this way, much as we have strong 
moral reasons to object to being forced into romantic or martial relationships that 
similarly limit the possibilities for our lives. To compel an individual, without her 
consent or authorization, to occupy a state of affairs that narrows the range of options 
amongst which her will can choose normally wrongs her. Such a narrowing is inherent to 
the procreation of any given individual. Hence, procreators wrong their future children by 
encumbering the future wills of the children they create.  
The encumbrance in question has two foundations. The first has already been 
mentioned: Simply by being brought into existence, we situate a person in circumstances 
not of his or her own choosing, circumstances that play a tremendous role in shaping who 
the individual is and what trajectories the individual’s life can have. The circumstances 
into which a person is brought into existence — the material realities of the earliest stages 
of a person’s life —are identity-constituting, exerting significantly more influence on her 
subsequent capacities, values, and attitudes than later stages. To a surprising extent, who 
one is and what one can reasonably expect from life is determined by social facts about 
one’s parents.  Procreation thus places us in early life circumstances that, even if highly 
desirable, we have no choice but to ‘endure’. Let us say, then, that procreation materially 
encumbers the future will of the person so procreated, both by fashioning her identity and 
by establishing the initial palette of options and avenues through which she may exercise 
that will. 
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The second foundation of this encumbrance is moral. Recall Shiffrin’s remark that 
“by being caused to exist as persons, children are forced to assume moral agency, to face 
various demanding and sometimes wrenching moral questions, and to discharge taxing 
moral duties.” Morality makes claims on our future wills, simply by virtue of our 
membership in the moral community. Procreation thus places us within the moral 
community that will make demands upon us. Furthermore, procreation serves to place an 
individual into a specific web of social relations not of her choosing and hence functions 
to determine the specific contents of one’s moral duties. That individual will have 
relationships with these siblings, these parents, these peers, etc. These relationships 
profoundly influence the shape of an individual’s life, in addition to creating filial and 
other duties.17 Thus, procreation morally encumbers a person’s will both by making it 
true that she has moral duties and by determining what duties she has. 
Again, the analogy to romantic relationships is illuminating. We observed earlier that 
there is not a positive right to romantic relationships. Why not? Entering into such a 
relationship encumbers the future wills of the parties: Such relationships shape the factual 
circumstances of a person’s existence while also creating normative expectations 
regarding one’s future choices and behavior (expectations of fidelity, care, etc.). Given 
the burdens and limitations that such expectations entail, we have strong reasons, then, to 
want to reserve for ourselves the latitude to determine which romantic relationships we 
enter into, even in cases where those relationships will be beneficial to us on the whole. 
Arranged marriage is thus objectionable because it encumbers our future wills in 
fundamental ways, even if it turns out to be an otherwise happy arrangement. Similarly, 
 
17 Keller, “Four Theories of Filial Duty,” and Jeske, Rationality and Moral Theory: How Intimacy 
Generates Reasons. 
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procreators assert a right to bring an individual into existence, an act which by its very 
nature generates wrongful burdens or claims on that individual’s future will.  
Others have argued for procreation being wrongful, but to my knowledge, none have 
argued that the wrong in question consists in its encumbering the wills of the procreated. 
No doubt the claim that procreation is inherently wrong will rub many the wrong way, so 
let us first address possible objections to this claim before turning the discussion in a 
more positive direction. 
An obvious concern about my claim is that, despite having interests, the not yet 
procreated lack wills by which to assert those interests. Hence, it might appear that the 
reasons for denying (say) a positive right to romantic relationships do not apply to 
procreation. Prospective romantic partners can exercise their wills via consent to a 
relationship, but notions of consent simply do not apply to the not yet existent precisely 
because they lack wills with which to consent. But it is not clear that a being needs a will 
at a given moment in order for there to be moral reasons not to encumber her future will 
any more than a being needs to be susceptible to pain at a given moment in order for 
there to be moral reasons not to cause her future pain. However plausible the principle 
that it is wrong to encumber a person’s future will, it does not seem to turn on a person’s 
having a will at the time when the encumbering occurs. That the not yet existent lack 
wills does not entail that procreation does not wrongfully encumber their future wills, 
which is the very same consideration that speaks against a positive right to relationships 
of other kinds.18 Perhaps the concern is with the timing of the wrong. I have claimed that 
 
18 This argument concerns whether prospective parents have a non-comparative claim on those they 
procreate to bring them into existence. A different argument for comparative claims to bring persons into 
existence is possible, roughly, that a positive right to procreation is grounded on considerations of 
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procreation wrongs the procreated by encumbering its future will. The time at which the 
wrongful event occurs thus diverges from the time at which the wronging in question 
occurs. But I do not see that such a divergence should trouble us. Granted, prospective 
parents cannot disregard the will of the child they procreate until the act of procreation 
occurs. But this merely illustrates that when a wrongful event occurs and when a person 
is wronged by that event need not temporally coincide.19  
A second objection to my argument for the claim that procreation wrongs by 
encumbering a future person’s will is that it appears vulnerable to a version of Parfit’s 
non-identity problem.20   
If in order to be harmed by being procreated in some set of circumstances C1, a person must be 
made worse off by being procreated in C1, then her existence by virtue of being brought into 
existence in C1 must be worse for her than it would have been were she brought into existence in 
some other set of circumstances. However, had that person been brought into existence in some 
other circumstances C2, that fact necessarily changes the identity of that person. Hence, being 
procreated in C1 cannot be a harm to that person. We therefore cannot harm a person by bringing 
her into existence.  
Note that the non-identity problem assumes that the wrongs of procreation consist in how 
procreation harms a person. However, my argument may appear to circumvent the non-
identity problem because it grounds the objectionability of procreation in the fact that it 
encumbers a person’s future will rather than in the fact that it harms her. Nevertheless, it 
 
distributive justice. It might be unfair for some to be able to procreate but others unable to do so due to 
luck, etc. But notice that the validity of any comparative argument will assume that at least some 
prospective parents have a prior non-comparative claim to bring individuals into existence. 
19 Shiffrin, “Wrongful Life,” 137-138. 
20 Parfit, Reasons and Persons, and Boonin, The Non-Identity Problem and the Ethics of Future People. 
 21 
might appear that my argument regarding the encumbering of a person’s future will could 
be attacked with parallel reasoning:  
If in order to be wronged by being procreated in some set of circumstances C1, a person’s will 
must be more encumbered by being procreated in C1, then the state of her will by virtue of being 
brought into existence in C1 must be more encumbered for her than it would have been were she 
brought into existence in some other set of circumstances. However, had that person been brought 
into existence into some other circumstances C2, that fact necessarily changes the identity of that 
person, and indeed, changes the initial state of her will. Hence, being procreated in C1 cannot be a 
wrong to that person. We therefore cannot wrong a person by bringing her into existence. 
However, whatever validity the non-identity problem has when applied to claims 
regarding harming a person via procreation, it is not valid when applied to my argument 
regarding procreative wrongs.  First, the wrong I have identified is not a comparative 
wrong. The wrong in question is not the purported wrong of rendering a person’s will 
more encumbered than it otherwise would have been. The moral reasons that make 
procreation objectionable do not rest on the claim that encumbering our wills in this way 
harms us comparatively, making us “worse off” with respect to the state of our wills than 
we would otherwise have been. For there is no way we would otherwise have been had 
we not been procreated, and no antecedent state of our wills that is encumbered by being 
procreated. It is rather the wrong of encumbering a person’s will without their 
authorization. By its very nature, procreation precludes the “joining of wills”21 necessary 
to permissibly encumber another’s will. Second, the wrong identified in my argument is 
not the wrong of procreating a particular person in some specifiable set of circumstances. 
The wrong consists in encumbering the will of a future person irrespective of the precise 
 
21 Ripstein, Force and Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy, 113. 
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circumstances of her procreation. The person is affected by being procreated. Thus, the 
wrong is not an impersonal wrong. However, that wrong does not rest on any special 
facts about the person’s identity as a person or the procreative circumstances that 
establish that identity. The wrong of encumbering a future person’s will is best 
understood as a de dicto rather than a de re wrong: a wrong done to whichever individual, 
or whichever rational will, is brought into existence by being procreated — a wrong to 
whomever the procreated individual turns out to be. 
 Finally, critics may contend that in proposing that procreation is inherently 
wrong, I thereby depict parents in a morally unflattering light. Virtually none of those 
who procreate intentionally mean to encumber their offspring’s wills, and those who 
procreate unintentionally would not wish ill on their offspring. I do not deny these 
assertions. Procreation is not generally malicious. However, it need not be malicious in 
order for it to have the properties that (I contend) make it wrongful. The wrong in 
question is best seen as akin to a violation of a strict liability standard: Procreation is 
wrongful thanks to a property inherent to it, and therefore, whether procreators acted 
intentionally, exercised due care, etc. does not affect its wrongfulness. And even if there 
were some way of showing that procreators are not at fault for this wrong, procreators 
who take responsibility for this wrong would nevertheless exhibit the “nameless virtue” 
Susan Wolf describes in terms of a “willingness to give more … than justice requires” 
when one is responsible for unjust outcomes.22  
 Section 2 cast doubt on the parent interest justification of the procreative model, 
illustrating how this interest does not seem sufficiently weighty, particularly when 
 
22 Wolf, “The Moral of Moral Luck,” 13-14. 
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juxtaposed with the burdens of being brought into existence, to justify ascribing to 
would-be parents a positive right to procreation. This section provides further reason to 
doubt that justification of the procreative model: Given that procreation makes an 
arguably wrongful claim on the future wills of those we bring into existence, the interests 
that would justify such claims must be extraordinarily valuable. In a sense, procreation is 
by necessity coercive. Prospective parents exploit the very features highlighted by 
Brighouse and Swift and by Overall (that parents choose to procreate but children do not 
choose to be procreated, that children cannot exit the relationship, etc.) to force not yet 
existent beings into relationships the parents value. In so doing, parents treat the rational 
will or agency of the children they create merely as a means. Such treatment, I maintain, 
cannot be justified by the relationship goods that may thereby flow to parents.  
 
4. How the wrongs of procreation ground parental obligations 
 Our discussion to this point shows how an adequate vindication of the procreative 
model must satisfy two desiderata. First, it must rest on some feature that is universally 
present in acts of procreation. Parental rights and obligations must come into existence 
due to procreation itself. Second, in light of the Plato worry, an adequate vindication 
must nevertheless morally bind particular procreators to their offspring. There must be a 
plausible account of how a procreator has rights and obligations with respect to all and 
only her offspring. 
The second desideratum — that parental rights and obligations must be specific to 
a procreator’s offspring — suggests that parental obligations cannot rest on general or 
impersonal duties. Given that (as I have argued) procreation encumbers a person’s future 
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will undeservedly, we might think that parental obligations are duties of justice. 
However, an appeal to justice misses that procreators do not just happen upon the 
situation in which a person’s future will is undeservedly encumbered. They are 
responsible for that situation. Parental obligations must instead fall under a category of 
obligation resting on prior acts of procreators. W.D. Ross identifies three categories of 
obligation resting on individuals’ prior acts. The first, fidelity, does not apply to 
procreation. Procreators have not made any promises to their offspring that would ground 
subsequent obligations. Nor does the second category, gratitude. Parents were not 
benefitted by their children’s acts. The only possibility left is duties “resting on a 
previous wrongful act.” 23 In procreating, one wrongs one’s children by encumbering 
their future wills.  While procreative parents cannot cancel these wrongs, they can 
compensate their children for them.24 
Rooting parental obligations in compensatory duties offers a superior justification 
of the procreative model, including its claims regarding parental rights. Parental 
obligations stem from the act of procreation, i.e., on parents having made the right sort of 
contribution to the existence of their children. It is through the wrongful act of 
 
23 The Right and The Good, 21. 
24 It may be inferred that the rights and obligations of those who become parents through non-procreative 
paths (for example, through adoption) cannot be rooted in this form of compensation. After all, a parent 
cannot compensate a child for the encumbrances of procreation if that parent did not procreate that child. 
This inference is incorrect, though. For while adoptive parents do not encumber through procreation, they 
nevertheless encumber through parenting, i.e., through placing the child in early life circumstances that 
greatly influence her subsequent identity and life trajectory. Moreover, while compensatory obligations 
cannot be renounced, they can be transferred. Adoptive parents, I propose, agree to acquire the 
compensatory obligations of a child’s procreative parents (obligations stemming from encumbrances of the 
will due primarily to genetics). Thus, while adoptive parents’ parental rights and obligations have two 
sources, they are nevertheless compensatory in nature and will not differ from those of procreative parents. 
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procreation that they incur the relevant compensatory obligations. Thus, a compensatory 
account of parental obligations depends on a universal feature of procreation, its 
encumbering of the procreated individual’s future will. Furthermore, because 
compensatory obligations are special obligations, a compensatory account also makes 
parental obligations specific to those one procreates: While the state of affairs that 
constitutes their fulfillment can be realized by someone besides the individual who incurs 
the obligation, they can only be discharged by the individual who incurs the obligation. 
Consider the special obligation of promise keeping: If S promises T that she will make it 
the case that P, S’s promissory obligation to T can in a sense be fulfilled if U makes it the 
case that P. However, in that instance, S has not discharged her duty to T.  Compensatory 
obligations are subject to the same underlying deontic logic: If S owes compensation to T 
for having wronged T, then U may ‘compensate’ T, thereby rendering T ‘compensated’ 
for S’s wrong. But again, S has not discharged her compensatory duty to T.  
A compensatory account of parental obligations is therefore invulnerable to the Plato 
worry. The Plato worry arises so long as we assume that the procreative model must 
derive its rationale from one of the parties’ interests. Whether that model’s rationale is 
that the assignment of parental rights to those responsible for procreation is in the (best) 
interests of children or that the assignment of parental rights (and obligations) serves a 
vital relationship interest of prospective parents, it is in principle possible that decoupling 
parental rights from procreation better serves the relevant interest. But by appealing to 
compensatory obligations, my defense of the procreative model dodges the Plato worry. 
For while it may well be true that children’s procreative parents are not necessarily best 
situated to discharge these obligations, it does not follow, in light of the special nature of 
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these obligations, that it would be just to distribute children and the associated right to 
parent children to those most able or willing to discharge those obligations. No doubt 
some will wish to undertake these obligations despite not having procreated. Adoption is 
certainly not ruled out on my account. However, to distribute children to those most 
willing to discharge these obligations is unjust, as it permits the procreators who incurred 
these obligations in the first place to circumvent them. 
 
5. From obligations to rights 
The source of procreative parental obligations, I have argued, is compensatory. 
The right to procreate, in turn, is a right to create beings to whom one is necessarily 
indebted simply by virtue of causing them to exist. However, the procreative model also 
maintains that procreation is the source of parental obligations as well. My compensatory 
account sees parental rights are acquiring their legitimacy from compensatory parental 
obligations. That is, because procreative parents have obligations to compensate their 
children, they must be accorded rights entitling them to exercise specific forms of care 
toward their children, the exercise of which provides those children the compensation to 
which they are entitled. The rights procreative parents have with respect to their own 
children — rights of guidance and control, decision making, etc. — are ascribed to them 
in part so that they may fulfill these compensatory obligations. The exclusivity of these 
parental rights, another feature of the procreative model, flows from the exclusivity of the 
parental obligations. The assignment of parental rights to them largely serves to make the 
fulfillment of their special compensatory obligations possible. At the same time though, 
these rights may justifiably be curtailed or forfeited by parents who do not fulfill the 
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corresponding obligations, in which case these rights fall on particular individuals who 
agree to undertake these obligations (adoptive parents) or on the community or society at 
large. 
As I noted at the outset, in grounding the procreative model in procreative parents’ 
compensatory obligations toward their children, I aim primarily to make sense of 
procreation as a source of parental rights and obligations. Although (as we shall see in the 
next section) education plays a distinctive role in parents discharging these compensatory 
obligations, parental rights and obligations are not a straightforward function of those 
obligations. Children have a wide range of interests and needs. Procreation, I propose, 
makes parents uniquely responsible for attending to these interests and needs. For by 
procreating, parents incur special obligations toward their children that render them 
morally accountable to their children in ways that strangers and others are not morally 
accountable to them. Thus, the currency of parental compensation takes many forms 
beyond direct attempts to compensate for children’s wills being encumbered. I would 
argue that when parents provide care toward their children, such as ensuring the 
availability of nutritious food, they are serving to disencumber their children’s wills and 
so provide indirect compensation. But that is not all parents are doing: They are also 
satisfying non-compensatory moral demands that nevertheless originate in their special 
compensatory relationship with their children. 
Still, one might find the fact that my compensatory account of parental rights and 
obligations divorces these from the antecedent interests of the relevant parties puzzling. If 
the arguments for the previous sections are sound, this is as it should be: Neither the 
interests of children nor the interests of parents are sufficient to justify the procreative 
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model of parental rights and obligations, particularly given (as I argued in section 3) that 
procreation wrongfully encumbers the future wills of children. Obviously, the interests of 
parents still bear on whether adults ought to procreate. But the decoupling of parental 
interests from their rights and obligations represents an advantage of my compensatory 
account. Individuals become parents for any number of reasons (and sometimes for no 
reason at all). By grounding parental rights and obligations in facts regarding the 
obligations that ensue from the act of procreation rather than the motivations for that act, 
my compensatory account is neutral regarding the reasons behind procreation and so can 
explain why those who procreate acquire parental rights and obligations irrespective of 
their motivating reasons (or the lack thereof). This compensatory obligations defense thus 
succeeds where neither the child interests nor the parental interests defenses do precisely 
because it attaches parental obligations to what, on the procreative model at least, 
generates them: the very act of procreation itself. Yet at the same time, it seems to give 
both sets of interests their due without ignoring either. Should parents desire to procreate, 
for whatever reason or for no reason at all, they may do so as long as they provide for the 
interests of the children thus created.  
A second puzzling feature of my compensatory obligations defense of the procreative 
model is that it appears to codify a permission to do wrong. If, as I have argued, 
procreation is on its face wrong because it encumbers the future will of those brought into 
existence, then why should we ascribe to individuals a right to do wrong via procreation? 
I concur that a moral right to procreation —a pre-institutional permission to bring new 
human beings into existence — is implausible. This is not because one needs the state’s 
moral permission to procreate. The wrongs of procreation are, on the view I have 
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defended here, ‘natural’. However, the absence of a moral right to procreate is compatible 
with there being moral considerations that militate in favor of recognizing a legal right to 
procreation. First, the moral right in question is not unlimited, and it is compatible with 
the general contours of my compensatory obligations account that the right to procreate 
be circumscribed by the capacity and willingness to discharge these obligations. We 
should, for example, be skeptical of procreative rights asserted by those with past records 
of child abuse or neglect, by early adolescents lacking the maturity to parent, and those 
with an express intent of abandoning the children they create. That said, preventing the 
wrongs of procreation must be juxtaposed alongside other morally important interests and 
considerations. Among these may be societal interests in, for example, maintaining a 
population level sufficient for intergenerational justice. Moreover, legal rights bring in 
tow burdens of enforcement that may be unreasonable or unjust in their own right. 
Attempting to prevent wrongful procreation may involve equally serious draconian 
wrongs of its own: intrusions into privacy in order to determine which parents will 
discharge their compensatory obligations, violations of bodily integrity in order to 
sterilize, compulsory abortion, and so on. That there may be no moral right to do X whilst 
there is a legal right to do X is not so odd after all. We may lack a moral right to break 
certain promises but still (and perhaps justifiably) have a legal right to break them. In any 
event, the state may sometimes have no right to compel people not to do what they have 
no moral right to do. 
 
6. Education as parental restitution 
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 I have proposed that the obligations associated with the procreative model of 
procreation are compensatory in nature and serve as the basis for parental rights. I 
conclude by considering how parental rights and obligations regarding education fit into 
this model as I have defended. In particular, how might parents make possible educations 
for their children that accord with these compensatory obligations? 
 The wrong of procreation, I have proposed, consists in how it encumbers the 
future will of a child. Many of the ways we might compensate for this wrong represent a 
different form of moral currency: By, for example, tending to a child’s material needs, a 
parent is at most only indirectly ‘unencumbering’ a child’s will. Education, however, can 
serve not merely as compensation, but as in-kind restitution for the specific wrong of 
procreation. A broadly liberal education, among whose purposes is to expose children to 
a variety of modes of life and to provide them with various generic goods and skills 
needed to pursue and implement those modes, can counteract the encumbrance of the will 
that procreation creates. Education thus offers a way of ‘giving back’ to the children we 
create the power over their future wills that procreation wrongfully encumbered.  
 Here Bruce Ackerman’s description of liberal education in terms of a “great 
sphere” is illuminating: 
The entire education will, if you like, resemble a great sphere. Children land upon the sphere at 
different points, depending on their primary culture; the task is to help them explore the globe in a 
way that permits them to glimpse the deeper meanings of the dramas passing on around them. At 
the end of the journey, however, the now mature citizen has every right to locate himself at the 
very point from which he began — just as he may also strike out to discover an unoccupied 
portion of the sphere.25  
 
25 Social Justice in the Liberal State, 159. 
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In encumbering the will, procreation locates a person at a given location on this sphere. 
Indeed, its influence on that location is likely greater than the “primary culture” to which 
Ackerman refers. But one’s location on this sphere determines what other locations one 
can perceive and travel to. That location thus establishes the horizon for one’s life-
shaping options and choices. There will be some locations on that sphere from which it 
may be difficult to travel from either because of lack of resources that make the 
surrounding terrain more challenging or because occupying that location has made 
perceiving or envisioning other locations harder. Poverty and cultural parochialism will, 
for example, be powerful factors in determining how mobile one is across this sphere. 
These differences in locations aside, however, procreation inevitably locates a person on 
this sphere and thereby encumbers her will to a greater or lesser degree. 
One antidote to this encumbrance, admittedly imperfect, is the provision of an  
education to children that enables the adults they will become to travel to various 
locations on the sphere, and if they so choose, to resettle at a different location. Such an 
education seeks to assist children, in ways that do not reflect cultural prejudice, in 
learning about locations on that sphere other than the one they presently occupy. This 
does not preclude that education giving greater attention to the history, culture, etc. of 
children’s local culture. After all, many children will opt to remain more or less at the 
location on that sphere where they started, and knowledge of its history and culture will 
be valuable in that context. Nor does this preclude parents, who presumably are co-
located with their children on that sphere, from inculcating in their children affection for 
that location. The overall aim of parenting and formal education is not to produce human 
agents who occupy the view from nowhere. Its aim is instead to produce human agents 
 32 
who, from wherever they are on this sphere, can perceive other locations with sufficient 
clarity to rationally ascertain which location they wish to occupy. Still, the restitutive role 
of education entails that parents’ rights to shape their children’s education in accordance 
with their own values is more limited than commonly thought. A parent whose principal 
concern regarding her children’s education is that the education instill her values in her 
children at any cost is compounding rather than redressing the wrongs of procreation I 
identified earlier. Dogmatic indoctrination, aimed not only at engendering affection or 
loyalty regarding the child’s existing location but also at either obscuring other locations 
or presenting them in an instinctively hostile light, is ruled out.  
Likewise, the skill set children acquire via education should not be excessively 
parochial. Their education should instill skills valuable in multiple locations on this 
sphere, including (to the extent possible) skills that will prove useful in future locations 
that have not yet emerged. 
As noted above, the encumbrances of a child’s future will that result from 
procreation are both material and moral. A liberal education of the kind I have been 
describing counteracts both kinds of encumbrance. It makes it more feasible for 
individuals to establish a different set of material circumstances for their lives, to modify 
their conceptions of themselves and the trajectories of their biographies. Liberal 
education counteracts the moral encumbrance of procreation in two ways. First, it invites 
individuals to scrutinize their own values and make independent judgments regarding the 
merits of alternative value systems. Second, it permits individuals to choose among 
different sets of possible social ties, and hence, to choose among different possible sets of 
specific moral obligations.  
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 These claims ought not be exaggerated. I am not suggesting, for instance, that 
children ought to be raised or educated in such a way that we maximize their future 
options — that the more ‘open’ a child’s future remains, the better.26 Certain options 
regarding a child’s future might permissibly be foreclosed to her because these options 
are uncontroversially awful. More generally, any process of human development is likely 
to put some occupations or ways of life out of the realm of the feasible. Nevertheless, that 
education can provide restitution for procreation’s having their future wills encumbered 
at least suggests a desideratum for a defensible educational regime: that it expand the 
possible trajectories of their existence, unlike the act of procreation itself.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 On its face, the compensatory account is not an especially rosy or heartening 
picture of the parent-child relationship. For the moral foundation of this relationship is 
not love, nor any good that flows to children or parents from this kind of relationship. Of 
course, in grounding parental obligations in compensatory obligations, I am not claiming 
that this is the very reason that parents do, or ought, to fulfill these obligations, nor that 
the fulfillment of these obligations exhausts the parental virtues. We may permissibly 
provide our children what we owe them from any number of motives besides the fact that 
we owe them.  
Still, grounding procreative parental rights in parental obligations to compensate 
children for encumbering their future wills avoids the problems that beset grounding 
these rights in the interests of children or of parents. It does so by appealing to a moral 
 
26 Feinberg, “The Child’s Right to an Open Future.” 
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bond that can only exist between procreative parents and their children. This 
compensatory rationale offers the best prospects for making sense of how procreative 
parents have both exclusive obligations toward, and rights regarding, the children they 
bring into existence. Granted, a central premise in my defense of the procreative model 
— that procreation is wrong as such — seems radical on its face. But further 
investigation suggests that my position is less radical than it appears. Procreators owe 
their children certain things, prominent among which is the real possibility that the initial 
conditions of their birth, conception, and upbringing do not function as fate — that, 
should a child so desire, she may rationally embrace a life path that diverges from those 
made most readily available to her by those initial conditions. My compensatory account 
of the procreative model merely homes in on the most philosophically plausible way to 
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